|Posted by firstname.lastname@example.org on May 18, 2016 at 4:50 AM||comments (3)|
|Posted by email@example.com on April 14, 2016 at 12:55 AM||comments (0)|
The results are in....
Acceptance Internationals partnership with UNICEF
Sanitation without landmines and Explosive Remnants of War
A project to provide an alternative to seeking privacy in areas contaminated with landmines and other explosive remnants of war on the approach to checkpoints in Eastern Ukraine
The sanitation is calculated to be be used by 2,303 male and 2,276 female civilians per day, of which 184 are Children
A total of 4,579 beneficiaries per day
From an average of 210,000 people who pass the checkpoints each month and who now have an alternative to seeking privacy in areas contaminated with landmines and other explosive remnants of war. An average of 137,370 take advantage of the facilities.
|Posted by firstname.lastname@example.org on November 15, 2015 at 1:10 PM||comments (0)|
In the traditional version of the acceptance approach to security an aid organization seeks to cultivate an atmosphere of trust and familiarity with beneficiaries and the host community. The idea is that beneficiaries and host community members will not target their ‘friends’ and will provide warning of impending attack by criminals or outsiders.
It’s a good approach that fits well with humanitarian ideals. Unfortunately many aid agencies fall victim to one or more of three acceptance ‘fallacies’ that prevent proper implementation of a real acceptance strategy. The first two have been outlined in “Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: Trends in Policy and Operations”, by Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer and Katherine Haver.
Passive or assumed acceptance fallacy: To put is bluntly this fallacy is the end result of faulty logic. The assumption is made that if the organization does not have protective and deterrent measures it must therefore have an acceptance based strategy.
The exceptionalist fallacy: The assumption that an organization can simply reiterate humanitarian principles and proclaim its neutrality and independence from all belligerent parties. The problem with this approach is that beneficiaries don’t read organizational policy documents and they often have learned to be suspicious of the moral proclamations of outsiders and those in positions of authority.
The good program fallacy: I sometimes refer to this as the ‘good houses’ fallacy. It is easy to assume that merely building ‘good houses’, or implementing good programming is all that is required to gain acceptance.
So how do we gain real acceptance? Stick around. We’ll discuss that in a future post.
Tags: NGO Security, Acceptance
Source: Patronus Analytical
Available at: www.patronusanalytical.com/files/Acceptance.php
|Posted by email@example.com on November 1, 2015 at 12:40 AM||comments (7)|
Download: https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-1067.pdf" target="_blank">www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-1067.pdf
This code seeks to safeguard high standards of behaviour and maintain independence and effectiveness in disaster relief. In the event of armed conflict, its clauses are to be interpreted and applied in conformity with international humanitarian law. It is a voluntary code, enforced by the will of organizations accepting it to maintain the standards it lays down.
Sponsored by: Caritas Internationalis, Catholic Relief Services, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Save the Children Alliance, Lutheran World Federation, Oxfam and the World Council of Churches (members of the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response), together with the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Available at: www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p1067.htm
|Posted by firstname.lastname@example.org on October 29, 2015 at 12:45 AM||comments (0)|
The Headington Institute partners with humanitarian relief and development organizations and emergency responders, before, during, and after deployment in order to ensure the wellbeing of individuals.
Their team of psychologists, many with over 30 years of clinical experience, bridge cutting edge academic research with practical application at the field level, in order to strengthen the impact of humanitarian response and promote the long-term wellbeing of humanitarian personnel.
ONLINE TRAINING OVERVIEW
The Headington Institute's free online training center - provides resources on stress, resilience, and humanitarian work.
Their materials range from longer online certificate courses to quick handouts, videos and self tests. They invite us to explore the major topic areas. Or, for quick reference, click on the resource index tab to view a complete list of all the resources they have available.
Source: Headington Institute 2015
|Posted by email@example.com on October 28, 2015 at 1:55 PM||comments (0)|
Published: October 23, 2015 | By DHClamp Consulting Ltd.
This report was prepared by DHClamp Consulting Ltd.
Excerpt: "Aid agencies will need to remain agile and informed to understand and mitigate threats in a rapidly evolving context"
This article looks at current constraints in humanitarian access to Syria as the conflict increases in both complexity and intensity. Although the focus here is on the increased vulnerability of aid agencies as a result of Russian tactics, it must be stressed that humanitarian assistance can be jeopardised by all parties to conflict, and as the fighting continues, further threats will emerge.
The civil war in Syria is now in its fifth year. Until the summer of 2015, the conflict could be understood as a conflict between President Assad’s regime—supported by Iran and Hezbollah—against factions roughly grouped into Kurdish groups in Turkey, Syria and Iraq, ‘coalition’ groups supported by the West, and more extreme Sunni groups such as Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda’s local affiliate Jabhat al Nusra (JaN). However, the allegiances of many of the Sunni groups within the conflict have changed frequently due to larger, more extreme organisations forcefully imposing their influence on smaller factions.
Fighting between different forces, in particular the recent land-based push by Assad, has geared toward the control of key roads—which poses a significant challenge for humanitarian assistance. Specifically, these are the M5 (which runs south from Aleppo via Hama and Homs to Damascus) and the M4 (which starts partway along the M5 south of Aleppo and runs to the coast in Latakia). At the same time the regime is also building its activity to the north of Aleppo—an area that over the past eighteen months has become a focus for conflict between opposition groups and IS, and to a lesser extent, the regime.
If Assad gains control of these routes, it will limit access to Aleppo province—which hosts 60% of the Syrian population—and the opportunity to move humanitarian supplies to its main city, Aleppo itself. The regime, Kurdish forces, opposition groups and the Islamic State split their power across the city, with aid agencies being forced to negotiate with all actors in order to gain humanitarian access. The two operational hospitals in Aleppo have been hit by Russian airstrikes in recent weeks and are no longer operational. A common tactic for the more extreme opposition groups has been for aid shipments to be stopped in order to influence the allegiance of the intended recipients.
On 30th September, the start of an overt Russian intervention in support of the Assad regime added to the complexity, and also impacted on the possibilities for humanitarian access. Until that date, the Assad regime looked weak and was increasingly restricted to the coastal region around Latakia and the southern provinces of Damascus, Hama and Homs. The Russian intervention has enabled the regime to extend its area of control quickly. At the start of the recent campaign, the regime was carrying out roughly 20 air strikes a day. Russian attacks were publicised as being directed against IS in Raqqa with the daily rate of air strikes increasing to 80. This is predicted to rise again to 300 per day—with evidence suggesting that the strikes have mostly been focussed on non-IS targets in Aleppo, Homs and Hama provinces.
Three aspects of the Russian military approach are of particular concern. Firstly, a form of anti-vehicle cluster bombs not previously seen in the conflict. A significant percentage (30-70%) fail to explode when they are dropped, and there is evidence on social media that some of the opposition groups, including JaN, have developed an ability to rebuild them into improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Secondly, the use of ‘dumb’ bombs, missiles which cannot be precisely targeted, and can therefore not distinguish between targets. Finally, the use of Russian helicopters, mostly flying in pairs over front line areas, again not discriminating over targets. These three new tactics increase the vulnerability of actors or aid convoys in affected areas.
Opportunities for the most recent managed humanitarian-assistance efforts have been the result of significant diplomatic intervention. UN-brokered negotiations in September have led to food deliveries by the ICRC to Madaya and Zabadan on the Lebanese border this month, and parallel deliveries by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and United Nations agencies to Kefraya and al-Foua in Idlib Governate, to the south west of Aleppo.
However humanitarian passage is rare and has been time consuming to implement. It will also not meet the significant and growing humanitarian needs in the country. The intensification of violence will in turn increase the already significant number of internally displaced people (IDPs). Aid agencies will need to remain agile and informed to understand and mitigate threats in a rapidly evolving context.
Syrian War Update: Aleppo Hospitals Close Following Airstrikes As Medical Organizations Blame Russian Campaign For Targeting Civilians, International Business Times, 19 October 2015 http/www.ibtimes.com/syrian-war-update-aleppo-hospitals-close-following-airstrikes-medical-organizations-2146633
Russia in Syria: Moscow to increase missions in Syria to ‘300 a day’, The Independent, 18 October 2015 http/www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/russia-in-syria-moscow-to-increase-missions-in-syria-to-300-a-day-a6698876.html
Relief trucks enter besieged Syrian towns – ICRC and sources, Reuters 18 October 2015 htt/www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/18/us-mideast-crisis-syria-relief-idUSKCN0SC0VP20151018
Turkey shoots down unidentified drone near Syrian border, The Guardian, 16 October 2015 http/www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/16/turkey-shoots-down-drone-near-syrian-border
Syria air strikes leaving many without aid: UN humanitarian chief, AFP, 16 October 2015 https/uk.news.yahoo.com/syria-air-strikes-leaving-many-without-aid-un-173942847.html#ErIayNl
Aleppo in turmoil as clashes intensify between ISIS, Syrian rebels and pro-Assad forces AraNews, 15 October 2015, http/aranews.net/2015/10/aleppo-in-turmoil-as-clashes-intensify-between-isis-syrian-rebels-and-pro-assad-forces/
A ‘kaleidoscopic’ mix of rebel alliances on Syria’s battlefield, Los Angeles Times, 12 October 2015,http/www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-syria-moderate-rebels-20151012-story.html
Water, power return to Syria’s Aleppo after three-week cut: monitor , Reuters 18 July 2015, http/www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/18/us-mideast-crisis-syria-aleppo-idUSKCN0PS0DZ20150718